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Abstract 
I begin with a general claim and two sets of orienting points. The claim: 
dialogue might be pursued under the aspect of sameness/self, under the aspect of 
difference/other, or both. I offer two points of reference: (1) specific pursuits of 
dialogue as life practice: (a) seeking truth and (b) moral endeavor and (2) two 
modes of pursuit: (a) listening and speaking and (b) acting against self-defense. 
Through a careful reading of the Meno, I offer an analysis of dialogue in 
relation to the categories mentioned above. Meno asks, ‘Can virtue be taught?’, 
and Socrates offers through dialogue provisional answers, on the basis of which 
we might suggest the following: First, we do not know what virtue is and must 
therefore remain open in the face of the question. Second, we can only approach 
such a question not with absolutes but with earnest and continuing inquiry. Third, 
as with life in general, we bring to our aid a set of curious possibilities and odd 
metaphors, following the twisting and obscure course of discourse itself. Fourth 
(not finally, for inquiry has no end) we must not only speak our answers and listen 
to the questions they contain; we must note the way life answers and questions, 
speaks and listens, and tune our often tin ears to the music emanating from the 
process itself in all its harmonics and varieties and discordant melodies. 
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The Practice of Dialogue:  
Socrates in the Meno 
 
 As I attempt to address this issue I find myself already caught in a web of 
multiplicity so vast and dense that I despair of finding any path through it. Let me 
then begin with a general claim and two sets of points by which we might orient 
ourselves. The claim: dialogue might be pursued either under the aspect of 
sameness and self or under the aspect of difference and other. My interest in the 
topic of dialogue covers both of these approaches, and each is, I believe, worthy 
of pursuit. They are even, one might say, hard to distinguish at their further 
points, like straight lines that continue parallel to infinity but that appear to 
converge at the horizon of our view. I offer two categories of points of reference: 
(1) specific pursuits of dialogue as life practice: (a) seeking truth and (b) moral 
endeavor, and (2) two modes of pursuit: (a) listening and speaking and (b) acting 
without self-defense. 
 Let us listen first to words from a well-known twentieth-century thinker, 
Robert Frost, who tells us: ‘Something there is that doesn't love a wall’ (1915, 
line 1). The practice of dialogue begins with this fact; it always calls us to note 
that no building of walls, whether epistemological or social or of mind or heart, 
remains the final word in our engagement with life. Later in Mending Wall Frost’s 
narrator says: 
 
‘Before I built a wall I'd ask to know  
What I was walling in or walling out,  
And to whom I was like to give offence.  
Something there is that doesn't love a wall,  
That wants it down.’ (1915, lines 32-36) 
 
I think that Socrates would approve, with the added proviso that that which one 
risks offending would be truth. 
Let us turn now to Socrates, and to a particular text. I do not claim to be either 
revealing or discussing the historical Socrates, a task too arduous and perhaps 
simply impossible to accomplish in these pages. I address instead the Socrates of 
one particular Platonic dialogue, the Meno (1924), recognizing that current 
scholarship generally places the Meno at a turning point in the Platonic corpus,1 a 
beginning of the move away from the more Socratic early dialogues to the middle 
period in which it is believed that Plato describes his own mature views.  
Much of interest occurs in the Meno; we will take up only two strands of that 
multiply-threaded tapestry: the discussion concerning whether virtue is desire of 
the ‘fine’ or beautiful and the brief suggestion that progress is being made when 
one discovers that one is perplexed. I want to address these pieces of the Meno 
                                                 
1 See e.g., Ionescu (2007) pp. xi-xii and Scott (2006) pp. 6-7.  
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merely schematically, with the hope that further dialogue might flesh out the 
discussion from the perspective of other interlocutors.1  
 
 
Desire for the good 
 
In the dialogue bearing his name, Meno has had considerable trouble 
answering the seemingly simple question of Socrates about the nature of virtue. 
Socrates insists first of all that neither he nor anyone he has heard knows the true 
definition of virtue, to which Meno expresses amazement. When, however, Meno 
attempts to give an answer to the question as to the nature of virtue, he finds it 
perplexingly difficult. We join the dialogue at the point at which Meno tries 
again, basing his new claim on a bit of literature. It seems that a poet has, 
conveniently, said that virtue is a desire for and the power to attain the beautiful 
(kalon). Meno quite approves of this definition and draws from it his current 
definition of virtue: virtue is a matter of the right desire and the right power. 
Socrates immediately takes up this claim, dividing it at its mid-point, so as to 
address for now only its first conjunct: virtue is desire for the beautiful. 
We might briefly summarize Socrates’ argument as follows: To desire the 
beautiful is to desire the good. Some then, Meno insists, desire the good and some 
the bad (or ugly!). Some desire the bad thinking it is good; others desire it 
recognizing that it is bad. Of those who desire the bad knowing it to be such, 
some think it will bring them benefit; those of course, Socrates points out, desire 
the bad as though it were good, at which point he briefly offers a definition of the 
good as that which benefits and of the bad as that which harms. If there remain 
some who desire the bad knowing it is bad and recognizing that the bad harms, 
they must recognize also that to desire something is to possess it. These people 
then desire to possess that which harms (them); in other words, they desire that 
which will make them miserable and unhappy. But this latter group seems to have 
no members, for, Socrates says and Meno agrees, no one wants to be miserable 
and unhappy. This line of argument then brings the discussion to a conclusion – 
the conclusion that no one desires the bad knowing what they are doing. The 
interlocutors offer at this point a major amendment of the original claim: it cannot 
be that what distinguishes the virtuous from others is desire for the good; 
everyone desires the good.  
We might note in passing that the text makes a subtle but possibly important 
move from speaking of ‘desire’ (epithumein) to speaking of ‘want’ (boulesthai); 
in the end we are told that no one ‘wants’ evil, not that no one desires it.2 Whether 
this distinction makes a difference to the argument is difficult to discern. Perhaps 
the difference is this: People do in fact desire things that are evil, even believing 
that these things bring harm, misery, and unhappiness; but no one wants evil in 
                                                 
1 For helpful recent discussions about the Meno, see, e.g., Ionescu, 2007; Scott, 2006; and Weiss, 
2001. 
2 See e.g. Ionescu, 2007, pp. 25-27, for further discussion of this distinction. 
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the sense of wanting the harm, misery, and unhappiness itself. This claim could be 
restated as: even though S does not want y (misery, let’s say), S can still desire x 
(the thing that produces misery); this seeming paradox relies on the quite obvious 
difference between implication in fact (x implies y) and recognition of that 
implication in one’s desires. I can, in other words, desire something without at the 
same time desiring its obvious consequences. The status of ‘wants’ might be, as 
Aristotle suggests, such that ‘without qualification and in reality, what is wished 
[wanted, boulesthai] is the good, but for each person what is wished is the 
apparent good’ (III, 4, 1113a, 24, 2000, p. 37). Want/wish then is a term for the 
aim at the good that orients all one’s deliberations and choices (Aristotle again); 
desire is a term for pure appetite. Whatever we wish to make of these distinctions, 
Socrates has clearly steered Meno away from his initial apparently elitist belief 
that he (Meno) and his friends are the only ones who are virtuous due to their 
desire for fine or beautiful things to a more egalitarian recognition that everyone 
desires or at least wants the good (and therefore, of course, the beautiful). 
 
 
The value of perplexity 
 
In this brief bit of dialogue, Socrates takes a conclusion Meno proposes 
(Meno having failed in two previous attempts to define virtue) and shows that on 
its own terms it is unsuccessful. Having dismissed the one conjunct, Socrates then 
takes on the other conjunct concerning the power to acquire good things. This 
discussion shows, primarily, once again the shallowness of Meno’s 
understanding. He deems the good to be wealth, political power, and political 
honors. Socrates leads him to see the faultiness of his aims. We will not follow 
that argument further here but will instead move past this discussion to the attack 
Meno levels at Socrates. In its simplest terms it reveals the frustration with 
philosophy as a project, a frustration that most of us experience at times and that 
students, especially beginning students, appear to feel regularly. If questions are 
the essence of philosophy (as many of us would maintain1), then what about 
answers? Must we dismiss answers entirely as irrelevant? Meno’s approach is 
more specific of course; he complains that he has moved from a comfortable state 
of being able to give speeches on virtue to a distinctly uncomfortable state of 
being speechless about the very same topic. The perplexity to which he has been 
reduced, he suspects, arises from tricks by which Socrates has enchanted him. The 
complaint then is not only that Meno dislikes the feelings he now has; it is that 
these feelings results from some sort of illegitimate trickery on the part of the 
philosopher. 
The simplest answer to Meno’s complaint is to say that he is an arrogant, and 
not very smart, apprentice railing against the wise master of the trade (of 
philosophy) who has merely shown him up for the fool he is. We might say that 
                                                 
1 In this regard one can hardly do better than look at the delightful last chapter of Russell (1997) in 
which he describes questioning as the essence of philosophy’s contribution to human life. 
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his perplexity heralds the possibility of wisdom. ‘It is,’ we might tell Meno, 
‘darkest before the dawn.’ Just stick around, my friend, and you will learn; your 
perplexity will vanish in the light of truth; and so on. Unfortunately, although 
Socrates does argue that perplexity proves to be a step in the right direction, we 
do not in the end see questions answered and the longing for truth and wisdom 
fulfilled1 (as if these are the things for which Meno longs). At the very end of the 
dialogue Socrates mentions a possible though still uncertain conclusion on the 
basis of their reasoning so far then says but for now we need to stop our inquiry 
only to return to these issues another day. 
This means that there is here both some good news and some bad. The good 
news is that those of us who consider ourselves philosophers, even in the most 
limited ways, will not soon be out of a job – philosophy continues because 
questions continue, apparently without end. The not-so-good news is that the 
answers we may have wished for in engaging in this form of inquiry just keep 
receding further and further away. One might begin the study of philosophy (as I 
did) with the aim of eventually getting it right (and I, personally, didn’t think it 
would take that long). Experience in the field, however, leads one to conclude that 
a lifetime might, under the best of circumstances, only get one started properly 
understanding the questions. 
Turning back to the Meno, the analogy of the slave boy learning something 
new in geometry offers an important point – when he is perplexed he is better off 
than when he falsely thought he knew. At the same time it can offer false hope 
about the kind of issue Meno and Socrates are discussing. Although mathematics 
is by no means as simple and straightforward as it might have seemed to the 
Greeks and to those of us with only an elementary understanding of it, it does 
offer, if one keeps to certain principles and draws very clear boundaries, some 
interesting and obvious answers to questions. Philosophy, on the other hand, 
suffers from the great advantage of being a ‘community of the question’ (Derrida, 
1978) for whom every answer only tells us what question to ask next. This is not 
to say that we cannot, by keeping to certain principles and drawing very clear 
boundaries, proclaim ourselves to possess some answers. It is only to say that 
once out of our philosophical infancy we recognize that the principles and 
boundaries are not a solution but another part of the problem; they are themselves 
always up for question. 
 
 
Teaching virtue 
 
Let us turn then from Meno’s perspective, that of the confused and angry 
recipient of too many questions, to that of Socrates. What is he doing? The initial 
question of the Meno is ‘Can virtue be taught …?’ to which Socrates answers 
with more than a touch of irony, what an amazing question – here I am not even 
knowing what virtue is and you have leaped beyond this level of ignorance to 
                                                 
1 Yet is not wisdom the result of beginning to know what one does not know? 
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another arena of thought entirely by asking whether it can be taught. Socrates 
does not allow the question to stand of course but moves the discussion 
immediately into an attempt to address the definition of virtue. It turns out then 
that Meno does not know what he claims to know; he does not know what virtue 
is. After the interlude during which Socrates questions the slave boy about 
geometry, they return to the question of whether virtue can be taught and Socrates 
reluctantly agrees to face this question directly. In the end, however, the question 
receives only a provisional answer, for how can it be answered until one knows 
what virtue is? 
Some would claim,1 and I am among them, that Socrates is answering the 
question all along the way. Meno begins with a high level of un-virtuous, perhaps 
even vicious, arrogance. Socrates, in clearing the ground of apparent knowledge 
plants seeds of virtue in Meno’s soul. Even if wisdom is not the heart of virtue (a 
topic addressed with uncertain results in the Meno), one can hardly be virtuous 
without it. And the heart of wisdom, it would seem even to those of us without 
much claim to wisdom itself, is a recognition that we know far less than we 
believe we do. The logic of question and answer2 is also a morality. One cannot 
truly ask without humility. One cannot stand face to face with a genuine 
interlocutor without allowing for at least reciprocity between oneself and the other 
and perhaps allowing for something more than reciprocity.3 One cannot face the 
Other – whether in the form of an idea, a question, or a person – without opening 
oneself to the profound realization of one’s own lack and the world’s mystery 
and, in some form or other, the possibility of transcendence. 
So Socrates here questions and in questioning answers, though not in the only 
way, the question he faces. Can virtue be taught? First, we do not know what 
virtue is and therefore must remain open in the face of the question and all its 
progeny. Second, we can only approach such a question not with a set of 
absolutes but with an earnest and continuing inquiry. Third, as with life in 
general, we can bring to our aid a set of curious possibilities and odd metaphors, 
following the twisting and obscure course of discourse itself, tracing the river of 
thought to its source, which is never exactly a source, since the river is not only 
impossible to enter once (or twice4 – even if we translate ‘river’ into the metaphor 
of river stages following Quine, 1961), it has a source which could be called both 
                                                 
1 See e.g., Scott (2006), esp. chapter 16, ‘Meno’s progress.’ 
2 Gadamer (1991) pp. 370-372 aligns his discussion of the logic of question and answer with R. G. 
Collingwood (1978) and (2002). 
3 Levinas (1998) follows Buber (1996) in pushing the importance of dialogue past ‘experience’ to 
‘encounter’ and then on to show that genuine dialogue takes us past any sense of control over the 
other or even reciprocity with the other to a sense of debt to the other. Levinas marks out the ethics 
of our encounter with the other as ‘first philosophy’ in other texts, e.g., 1969. 
4 There’s some confusion as to what Heraclitus says about stepping into rivers, but one traditional 
claim is that he says that no one can step into the same river twice (as Plato has it in Cratylus 
402a, but compare Heraclitus fragment DK22B12). Cratylus, then, is supposed to have said in 
response that one cannot even do so once (Aristotle Metaphysics 1010a13, where the Platonic 
claim about Heraclitus is repeated). 
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itself and not itself in the endless, unrepeatable cycle of water flowing to the seas 
and the seas returning to the sky and the sky returning to the rivers. Fourth, and 
not finally for in this endeavor there is no end, we must not only speak our 
answers and listen to the questions they contain; we must note the way life 
answers and questions, speaks and listens, and tune our tin ears to the music 
emanating from the process itself in all its harmonics and varieties and discordant 
melodies. 
 
 
Dialogue as moral practice 
 
I return now to say that the web of the multiplicity of questions and answers, 
and of answers and questions, lies just beneath the surface of our everyday 
dialogues as well as of our hearty philosophic ones. Socrates stands at our side 
whispering words of encouragement when we falter and of discouragement when 
we think we have succeeded. The thing one must love about philosophy (whether 
one will or not) is that it offers wonder in place of certainty, questions to every 
answer, and a long endeavor that shows us exactly why in thought as well as fact: 
 
Something there is that doesn't love a wall,  
That sends the frozen-ground-swell under it,  
And spills the upper boulders in the sun,  
And makes gaps even two can pass abreast. (Frost, 1915, lines 1-4) 
 
Let us return for a moment to issues with which we began: the aspects of 
sameness/self and difference/other and the undertaking of dialogue as seeking 
truth and as moral practice through modes of listening-speaking and of countering 
self-defense. Dialogue as practiced by Socrates might seem to remain within the 
aspect of sameness/self in that Meno has no voice once he has provided his series 
of faulty definitions or his attack on Socratic perplexity. The alleged dialogue of 
reason has been accused of being merely a hegemonic monologue, that is, a single 
voice listening only to itself and beating all foreignness into submission.1 Yet if 
Socrates is, as he claims, perplexed himself and if he pursues the question of the 
nature of virtue in earnest, the process of question and answer becomes a 
movement guided not by self and not monotonically, but listening always to the 
other of ‘reason’. This other might not be a simple sameness but might itself 
involve an encounter with a beyond that cannot be contained within any single, 
simple perspective. Reason itself might be less a choir without discord than a 
symphony full of contrasts, disharmonies, multiplicities, and difference (yet with 
guiding melodies of a rich complexity not ever to be wholly contained by human 
                                                 
1 See e.g., Levinas (1969) and (1998). 
  
8 
thought). In that case, listening to reason and attempting to speak with or for it 
becomes an encounter rather than a monologue.1 
We see, then, in the Socratic practices described above a truth-seeking 
dialogue as moral practice as well as modes of listening and speaking. The place, 
finally, of countering self-defense must be addressed here briefly. Meno finds 
himself in this dialogue constantly defending himself, but against what we might 
ask. It seems that he defends himself against the truth, but how might such a 
defense benefit him?  
Are we, one might ask, benefited by maintaining our version of the truth 
against all questions? Are we made better, our lives made richer, by turning aside 
from that which questions, from that which would say nay to our certainties? Or 
are we instead benefited by refusing, finally, to defend ourselves against truth and 
questions, benefited by allowing walls to tumble to the ground instead of 
maintaining them at all costs? Socrates, and here I hope we would follow him 
explicitly, says we are only benefited by examining our lives and thoughts, our 
ideas and ideals, until we welcome genuine perplexity and shun miserly certainty, 
making the logic of question and answer a moral stance that leads us to see that 
virtue can at least be taught to the extent of our recognizing learning and 
questioning themselves as virtues and the refusal to learn or question as a vice. 
The problem of self-defense lies in identifying ourselves with our opinions. If 
I believe that my beliefs of the moment stand not merely as one set of ideas I hold 
at one time to be replaced in the course of things by others, I might so identify 
with them that I take a given set of beliefs to be me. When that is the case I may 
defend them with the same level of violence, at least on the verbal level, with 
which I would defend my life. Socrates calls his interlocutors to recognize their 
interests as lying on the side of truth rather than on the side of the maintenance of 
current beliefs. Thus the self-defense one might engage in to uphold or rebuild the 
walls of belief can turn instead to open acceptance of the potential to learn. Self-
defense, in terms of unquestioning defense of one’s beliefs, becomes the enemy of 
truth and Socratic dialogue the enemy of self-defense. 
So in our philosophical wandering and wondering, we see that walls stand, 
sometimes, for the simple purpose of reminding us to ask and wonder and 
question and encounter that which we think we know but do not. And when we 
meet a wall that does not want to be met in return, we must join the earth in the 
disassembly of that wall or at least we must join one another in raising the 
question by which it is, perhaps, truly reinforced, until, that is, Socrates comes 
along and asks the question we have missed, producing a gateway through the 
crumbling barricade and an open passageway, where at least two may walk and 
talk, and where no path existed before. 
                                                 
1 Gadamer (1991) addresses such a possibility in his discussion of the I-Thou relation, pp. 358-
362. 
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